International cooperation in Haiti: organization for what?

Sueli Goulart e Rodrigo Prado da Costa

Summary
This paper aims to reflect about the contradictions of international cooperation for development in Haiti that can be summarized in two perspectives: the North-South cooperation (NSC) and South-South cooperation (SSC). The dynamics of relationships can mix them (N-SSC). We identified governmental and nongovernmental particularly in health, linked to the OECD, the ALBA-TCP and UNASUR as empirical sources for reflection. The OECD privileges the perspective of NSC: commitment of developed nations with undeveloped. It operates mainly through NGOs. The ALBA-TCP and UNASUR have followed the perspective of SSC: commitment and solidarity among nations alike. They emphasize the horizontal partnership based on solidarity, respect for national sovereignty and peculiarities of each country. The resumption of the categories imperialism and internationalism may contribute to the understanding and analysis the contradictions in the international development agenda, illustrated by how these different actor in Haiti organize their actions. While the first one indicates bonding mechanisms geopolitical hierarchy, the latter suggests possibilities for overcoming these mechanisms.

Keywords: International cooperation. Haiti. Imperialism. Internationalism. Organization studies.

Cooperação Internacional no Haiti: organização para quê?

Resumo
Este artigo objetiva refletir sobre contradições da cooperação internacional para o desenvolvimento no Haiti, resumidas em duas perspectivas: cooperação Norte-Sul (CNS) e cooperação Sul-Sul (CSS). A dinâmica das relações pode misturá-las (CN-SS). Identificamos atores governamentais e não governamentais, na área da saúde, vinculados à OCDE, à ALBA-TCP e à UNASUL como fontes empíricas para a reflexão. A OCDE se orienta, predominantemente pela CNS, ou seja, pelo compromisso de assistência que os países desenvolvidos oferecem aos subdesenvolvidos. Opera principalmente através de ONGs. Nas ações da ALBA-TCP e da Unasul predominam a perspectiva da CSS: comprometimento solidário entre nações iguais. Enfatizam a parceria horizontal baseada na solidariedade, no respeito à soberania e peculiaridades de cada país. A retomada das categorias imperialismo e internacionalismo contribui para compreensão e análise das contradições na agenda internacional do desenvolvimento, ilustradas pelas formas mediante as quais esses diferentes atores organizam suas ações no Haiti. Enquanto as dos países da OCDE denotam mecanismos geopolíticos hierárquicos, as ações dos países vinculados à ALBA-TCP e da UNASUR sugerem possibilidades de superação desses mecanismos, buscando a cooperação genuína e autodeterminada.


Cooperación Internacional em Haiti: ¿organización para qué?

Resumen

Este artículo objetiva reflejar sobre las contradicciones de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo en Haití, resumidas en dos perspectivas: la cooperación Norte-Sur (CNS) y cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS). La dinámica de las relaciones puede mezclarse (CNS-SS). Identificamos actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, particularmente en salud, vinculados a la OCDE, a la ALBA-TCP y a la UNASUR como fuentes empíricas para la reflexión. La OCDE prioriza la perspectiva de CNS: compromiso de los países desarrollados con los subdesarrollados. Opera principalmente a través de ONGs. Las acciones de la ALBA-TCP y la Unasur predominan la perspectiva de CSS: compromiso y solidaridad entre países iguales. Elanzan la parcería horizontal basada en la solidaridad, respeto a la soberanía y peculiaridades de cada país. La retoma de las categorías imperialismo e internacionalismo contribuye al entendimiento y análisis de las contradicciones en la agenda internacional del desarrollo, ilustradas por las formas mediante las cuales estos diferentes actores organizan sus acciones en Haití. Mientras las de los países de la OCDE denotan mecanismos geopolíticos jerárquicos, las acciones de los países vinculados a la ALBA-TCP y de la Unasur sugieren posibilidades de superación de estos mecanismos, buscando la cooperación auténtica y autodeterminada.

En este artículo se reflexiona sobre las contradicciones de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo en Haití, resumidas en dos puntos de vista: cooperación Norte-Sur (CNS) y cooperación Sur-Sur (CSS). La dinámica de las relaciones pueden mezclarse (CN-SS). Identificamos los actores gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, en la salud, de la OCDE, del ALBA-TCP y UNASUR como fuentes empíricas para la reflexión. La OCDE se orienta principalmente por la CNS, es decir, ofrecen asistencia a los países sudesarrollados. Opera principalmente a través de ONGs; en las acciones del ALBA-TCP y UNASUR predominan la perspectiva de CSS: el compromiso solidario entre naciones iguales. La énfasis es en la colaboración horizontal basada en la solidaridad, el respeto a la soberanía y las peculiaridades de cada país. La reanudación de las categorías imperialismo y internacionalismo contribuye a la comprensión y el análisis de las contradicciones en la agenda de desarrollo internacional, ilustrada por las formas en que los diferentes actores organizan sus acciones en Haití. Mientras que los países de la OCDE indican mecanismos geopolíticos jerárquicas, las acciones de los países vinculados al ALBA-TCP y UNASUR sugieren posibilidades para la superación de estos mecanismos, buscando la cooperación genuina y autodeterminada.

**Palabras clave:** Cooperación internacional. Haití. Imperialismo. Internacionalismo. Estudios organizacionales.

**Introduction**

Often, the words used in reference to Haiti are related to enormous difficulties. We agree with Castor (2012), for whom it is the lack of a historical perspective that encourages references to a ‘failed State’, ‘impractical’ or ‘a pariah State with no future’. Therefore, we begin this text with a brief synthesis of the historical background.

Until the early nineteenth century, Haiti was the most productive colony in the Americas (GORENDER, 2004)\(^1\). Its economy was based exclusively on the production of sugarcane on extensive landholdings. References from the French settlers and other colonies at the time emphasized the wealth of what was then called Saint-Domingue: “France lived from Haiti and North America lived by selling food and implements to Haiti,” said Darcy Ribeiro, in an interview (RIBEIRO, 1997\?). In the eighteenth century, that part of the island of Hispaniola became known as the “Pearl of the Antilles”.

The source of all this wealth was the exaggerated exploitation of the workforce, from which every ounce of energy was extracted, and which was maintained on the scourcest of rations, living in squalid conditions and suffering daily cruelty that is common to every slave system. Besides the frequent floggings, the violence was even crueler for those considered unruly, who could be buried alive, standing upright with only the head above ground, so they had their faces were eaten by insects and animals (JAMES, 2000).

\(^1\) In the documentary, The Brazilian People, Darcy Ribeiro states that “Haiti and Brazil had been the two richest colonies in America since the sixteenth century.”
Between the end of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century Haiti was the centre of one of the most important events in western history (CASTOR, 2012). A world dominated by slavery, colonialism, and racism, was astonished by the struggle of the Haitian population’s struggle, first, to end their slavery (achieved in 1794) and, shortly after, to declare the country’s independence in 1803. Inspired by the ideals that had sparked the French Revolution, the ‘Black Jacobins’ (JAMES, 2000) fought for about 10 years against a French army of about 25,000 soldiers commanded by General Leclerc, Napoleon’s brother-in-law. Led by Toussaint L’Ouverture until his arrest and death in a French prison, and then by Dessalines, the Haitians preliminarily declared independence in November 1803, which was made final on 31 December the same year. The former French colony became a State and replaced the name the colonists had given - Saint-Domingue - with its original Amerindian name - Ayiti. In 1804, it had its first Head of State: Dessalines, who was followed by Christophe, and later by Pétion, who were all members of the independence struggle. The latter carried out land reform in the Country.

Pétion was succeeded by Boyer, who is remembered for agreeing to pay France 150 million francs for the country’s independence in 1825. Haiti only completed the payment after the Second World War - more than a century later (MATIJASCIC, 2009; SUTTER, 2010).

After independence, the country had resumed traditional African subsistence farming. However, very quickly the military-oligarchy that assumed power began to reproduce the pattern of colonial domination, this time based on coffee farming. The almost exclusive appropriation of power over the country’s resources was challenged by peasant movements. At the same time, some representatives of the ruling order expressed the desire to introduce industrialization and promote a broader-based agriculture to overcome the economic barriers and re-balance the social forces. The intransigence of the established power led to the polarization of the struggle for power between the two sectors of the oligarchy, while the peasantry continued to struggle for its claims. Fostered by frequent foreign interference, Haiti became the scene of constant agitation and severe constraints on its sovereign governance (CASTOR, 2012).

Thus, the international presence in Haiti came to be justified due to the need for political stability in order to build the nation and the extreme poverty of the population. Those interventions have been primarily political and military in nature. Among the most striking, is that of U.S. intervention in the period from 1915 to 1934, when, to prevent any European power from regaining control of the country and to defend its interests in the troubled context of the First World War, the United States decided to intervene in Haiti. Although the government was formally in the hands of the Haitian mulatto elite, the United States exercised
veto power over all government decisions. In the economic field, Matijascic (2009) points to the U.S. investments in infrastructure, such as building bridges, hospitals, schools and telephone and sewerage systems. The concentration of wealth in Port au Prince, with advantages for the mulatto elite, consolidated that group not only as the political elite but also as the economic elite of the country, linked to U.S. interests.

With periods of dictatorship followed by attempts to introduce popular regimes\(^2\), the country’s constant political instability and economic and social fragility justified the actions of international organizations that culminated in the formation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004. Under Brazilian command, the MINUSTAH contains troops from several countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Croatia, Ecuador and Guatemala, among others, in addition to the ubiquitous United States and France. Apart from providing operational support to the Haitian National Police (HNP), MINUSTAH responded to other recommendations of the UN Security Council. One of the priorities of the mission is, as can be read on its website (MINUSTAH, 2011), the reform of legal system, which comprises different facets, such as the professionalization of the police and the implementation of actions aimed at strengthening the judicial and prison systems.

After the earthquake of January 2010 and a new resolution (10 October, 2010), the UN Security Council decided to increase the level of the global forces in MINUSTAH to support the reconstruction and stability of Haiti, by attributing it special tasks in an humanitarian recovery effort and to encourage other actors to engage in the joint planning of actions at the national and local levels. The intention was to strengthen logistical support and technical expertise so that the Government of Haiti could rebuild its forces and administrative apparatus, as well as aid in the preparation and conduct of the elections that would be held that year (MINUSTAH, 2011). Since the outbreak of the cholera epidemic in Haiti, for which MINUSTAH was held responsible and which killed 8000 people and infected 650,000 more, individuals and social movements have advocated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. The latest manifestation was the Open Letter from the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Relations of the UNASUR countries, published in Buenos Aires on May 31, 2013 (DIALOGO 2000, 2013).

The devastation caused by the earthquake in January 2010 has triggered countless international aid actions in Haiti, the catastrophe led to a significant expansion in the scope of projects and the number of partners in the Country, from emergency assistance to large-scale

\(^2\) The governments of Papa and Baby Doc and attempts by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, respectively, are the most obvious examples.
road infrastructure (re)construction projects. Within this scenario, we identified several actors, such as the governments of various countries, multilateral and non-governmental organizations, which engage in so-called international cooperation. We have summarized the foreign operations in Haiti in two main areas: the North-South Cooperation (NSC) and South-South Cooperation (SSC). Our aim is to provoke reflection on the contradictions regarding the international cooperation for development, particularly in the field of health. These reflections are based on observations made while preparing the document Profile of the International Cooperation on Health in Haiti\(^3\) (GOULART, COSTA, MISOCZKY, 2013).

We begin with a brief historical and conceptual synthesis of international cooperation. We continue, with a description of the international cooperation carried out in Haiti within the scope of NSC, led by the OECD\(^4\), and that with the scope of SSC through the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America - Tratado de Comércio de los Pueblos\(^5\) (ALBA-TCP) and Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). Finally, we examine the categories imperialism and internationalism (AMIN, 2005; LOWY, 1998; HARVEY, 2010) in order to encourage reflection on means by which different strands of international cooperation organize their activities in Haiti. Our assumption is that these categories contribute to the understanding and analysis of the contradictions within the international development agenda.

**Brief overview of international cooperation**

The contemporary notion of international cooperation began to gain strength and organize activities in the period following the First World War. The degree of the resulting destruction and the interests at play in the task of reconstruction showed the need to establish rules capable of organizing relations between different national states. The first international organization, the League of Nations (AMORIM, 1994) was created during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and focused on the preservation of peace and the resolution of

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3 Document produced under the Agreement of the Ministry of Health with the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul to support the implementation of the Memorandum of Cooperation Brazil-Cuba-Haiti for Strengthening the Haitian Health System.

4 Currently the OECD has 34 member countries from all regions of the world, the majority considered highly developed countries (like the United States, France, Canada, Japan, UK, Spain, etc...), and others considered emerging (Mexico, Chile and Turkey). Countries like China, India and Brazil are considered partners (OECD, 2013).

5 Founded in 2004 on the initiative of Venezuela and Cuba, the membership of ALBA currently includes, besides those two countries, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda (ALBA-TCP, 2013).
international conflicts through mediation and arbitration. Although President Woodrow Wilson was among its founders and strongest advocates, the U.S.A did not join the League, because it was barred by the U.S. Congress. Evidently, the absence from the outset, of one of the countries with clear intentions to establish hegemony in international relations, together with other factors such as occupation of the nations defeated in World War I and their reassertion, led to the failure of the League, which culminated in the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

The Second World War was a milestone for the resumption of the creation of international organizations for the maintenance of peace and cooperation among peoples. From among the various conferences and treaties with this purpose, there appeared numerous multilateral organizations that have given rise to many others, such as the United Nations (UN), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Within this scenario, disputes between the protagonists of the Cold War intensified and certainly marked the character of international cooperation efforts and strategies up until the mid 1980s.

Along with the idea of development being a constitutive element of international cooperation, technological progress came to be understood as essential to improve standards of well-being of large populations. Accordingly, in the UN General Assembly of 1948, Resolution 200 formally established technical assistance for economic development (KAPL, 2009). This resolution reiterated the promotion of economic and social progress as one of the main goals of the UN and at the same time, the belief that the lack of a technological capacity was among the key factors that prevented the development of peripheral countries.

As Cervo (1994) points out, at the outset, one of the central features of technical cooperation was the non-commercial transfer of technical assistance and know-how; the uneven development between the recipient and the provider of assistance; and the joint implementation of projects covering experts, training, reference materials, the acquisition of equipment and the preparation of studies and research. Based on this concept, and in order to facilitate and strengthen multilateral action on health, the World Health Organization (WHO) was created in 1948 as part of the UN system.

In the 1950s and 60s it was believed that the path to development was necessarily linked to the need for massive capital investments in developing economies because, despite the relative scarcity of financial resources in the productive sector, there was a relative abundance of raw materials and, particularly, labour (IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010). Within this conception, the transfer of technical knowledge took place within model of international cooperation that was essentially assistentialist in nature and fostered dependence. It did not
provide the bases for the formation of autonomous development or sovereign countries; instead it merely reproduced and deepened the relationship of dependency between the developed states (providers) and undeveloped (receivers) (CERVO, 1994). Those decades were also marked by the intensification of the global East-West rivalry and, within that context, international cooperation was used by the superpowers (the U.S.A. and the USSR) to maintain strategic alliances and political influence over the countries within their respective orbits (IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010). In other words, the cold war contributed decisively to the institutionalization of development cooperation (MILANI, 2012).

It should also be remembered that it was in the post-war period that the United States established the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe. The European Economic Cooperation Organization was created to administer the funds provided by the plan and to foster cooperation among the member countries. In 1961, the organization changed its name to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and increased the number of members and its geographical range, with the aim of helping underdeveloped countries to achieve economic growth. In 1969, with the formation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and in 1972, with the creation of the expression Official Development Assistance (ODA) (OECD, 2009), the OECD became a forum for conciliation between Northern donors and Southern receptors in which important concepts and guidelines and targets for the international development cooperation were formulated (LOPES, 2008).

Since the coining of the phrase Official Development Assistance (ODA), international cooperation, which had already incorporated technical progress and economic growth as guiding principles, deepened the economic bias, without revoking its geopolitical nature; According to Pena (2009, p. 396), by introducing the basis of the concept of ODA, the OECD redefined what was meant by foreign aid. Among the major redefinitions were the exclusion of military aid as part of ODA; the official recognition that ODA would be exclusively government to government aid; and the insertion of ‘concessionality’ by which only those loans that included at least 25% as a ‘donation element’ would be considered those ODA loans. At the same time, the OECD has included various forms of transfer of resources from developed countries to developing countries in order to facilitate the achievement, by the former, of the minimum recommended levels of assistance. Among the various methods to achieve these rates are loans and credits, debt relief, grants, technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance, food aid and aid to resettled refugees in donor countries (Alonso and Fernandes, 2005). It should be noted that, although government should be the source of funds for ODA, there are no obstacles to those funds being passed through NGOs and other entities, provided they are applied in the beneficiary countries listed by the DAC. Haiti is among the
In the 1970s, international cooperation policymakers believed that the failure of technical cooperation for development in the 1950s and 60s was mainly due to low capital contributions (failure or misapplication), or, moreover, the lack of adequate endogenous conditions. Others, however, argued that inefficiency was due to problems related to development in addition to the deficiency of resources. In the attempt to understand the factors limiting development in developing countries, theories emphasizing the dependence of peripheral economies compared to developed economies gained strength (IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010). There was, then, a refocusing of international cooperation policy with greater emphasis given, within the concept of development, to the social themes of redistribution and democratic governability, which even led several donor countries to modify their policies (HIRST and ANTONINI, 2009; GONÇALVES, 2010). Under this guidance, specialized UN agencies or others related to them were created or strengthened as the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which opened greater room for action within the countries in the South (GONÇALVES, 2010).

The combination of several global macroeconomic factors, mainly involving donor countries, radically changed the environment for cooperation in the 1980s. In response to the economic crisis, there was the affirmation of liberalism within the Bretton Woods institutions and agencies of the UN system (IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010). The crisis led to a decrease in the amounts donated and greater rationalization of resources, and pointed to NGOs as an alternative means of administrating projects. That period saw the apogee of the doctrine of cooperation via structural adjustment, with the transfer of resources increasingly in the form of budget support to countries being conditioned upon political reforms. Thus, in line with the doctrine of the Washington Consensus, the basic idea in the 1980s was that “it is not worth wasting resources on projects in which the ‘structural and political environment is inappropriate’. First of all, it is necessary to reform the economic institutions” (ALONSO and FERNANDES, 2005).

Among the implications of the end of the Cold War for international cooperation policies are the changing role of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, which for the most part passed from being donors to recipients of international aid; a decrease in the emphasis given to issues of security that had driven cooperation (U.S., mainly) with the Eastern European countries, as part of the conflict; and the reduced competition (at least at that time) for the markets of developing countries. With the end of the Cold War, these
interactions lost much of their importance. In addition, donor countries had to begin to justify to their taxpayers the efficiency of the cooperation mechanisms and their suitability to the tasks outlined (ALONSO and FERNANDES, 2005). To illustrate the difficulties related to financing international organizations in this period, it should be remembered that while the UN recommends that developed countries destine 0.7% of their gross national product (GNP) as ODA, only five countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden) managed to reach that goal (OPAS, 2007).

In the 1990s, the UNDP introduced the concept of human development as a counterpoint to the purely economistic view of some multilateral financial institutions (AYLLÓN, 2007). It is worth noting that the Global Conferences and the Millennium Development Goals established by the UN touched on previously neglected development-related issues such as the environment, human rights and social issues. These events were influenced by a significant mobilization on the part of groups in civil society and international public opinion (GONÇALVES, 2010).

Since then, the capacity of the ODA as an instrument capable of designing and implementing policies for international cooperation has been increasingly questioned, as noted in the document from the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization:

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) does not meet even the minimum amount needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and confront the growing global problems. Nor does the multilateral system responsible for designing and implementing international policies appear effective. It suffers, in general, from a lack of political coherence and it is not sufficiently democratic, transparent or accountable (COMISSÃO MUNDIAL..., 2005, p. xi).

Marked by unequal relations, in which “cooperation is provided by the one who has the best financial, technological, political resources etc., and is received by the one who lacks the necessary conditions for development” (COELIN, [200 -?] p 27), this model was limited essentially to North-South relations and suffered a decline due to the reduction in the resources allocated by traditional donors, among other factors.

In fact, this model of international cooperation, although dominant, was not the only one in existence in the post-war period. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77) in the 1950s and 1960s reflected an attempt to achieve self-determination and escape from the powerful political and economic influence of the dominant countries in the international system (JOY-OGWU 1982 apud GONÇALVES, 2010).

In the 1970s, those countries considered undeveloped and the newly independent countries (particularly the last colonies in Africa), sought to establish less assistentialist and interventionist cooperation mechanisms by building relationships intended to be among equals. The vast majority of these countries are located in the southern hemisphere and the
attempt to offset the hierarchical model of international cooperation, defined it as South-South Cooperation (SSC).

For Coelin [200 -?], the milestones in the construction of the concept of SSC or horizontal cooperation were the Action Programme for Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, adopted at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1972; the Buenos Aires Action Plan, adopted by 138 countries attending the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, held in Argentina in 1978; and the Caracas Action Programme, formulated by the G-77 in 1981.

The Buenos Aires Conference became the benchmark for the first collective efforts to identify and systematize the forms, means and possibilities of technical cooperation among developing countries (IGLESIAS PUENTE, 2010). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, on the recommendation of the UNDP and the initiative of some developing countries, especially through the action of the G-77, several international conferences on South-South Cooperation were convened. SSC also came to stand out in the context of multilateral agencies, again coinciding with a period in which the middle-income countries lost their position as beneficiaries of ODA. Thus, actions in the context of South-South cooperation received greater impetus and became part of the strategy of many countries to advance their development processes.

Resolution n. 64/222, the result of the High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, held in Nairobi in December 2009, registered what the member countries understood regarding this type of cooperation. It highlighted the sharing of experience and affinities between the peoples and countries of the South, stating that such relations should not be seen as “official development assistance”, describing it as “an equal partnership based on solidarity” and based on respect for national sovereignty and the peculiarities specific to each country “free of any constraints.” It goes on to state that SSC is guided by a multilateral approach, including NGOs, the private sector, civil society, universities and other actors “that help to meet the challenges and development objectives, in line with national development strategies and plans” (UNITED NATIONS 2010).

When trying to establish differences between North-South and South-South Cooperation, Milani (2012, p. 213), points to the need to:

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Therefore, the author puts forward the argument that countries like Brazil, India and South Africa (considered by the OECD as middle-income countries and ‘emerging’ donors), which have been the object of the NSC should be aware of the “risks of reproducing the type of experience (‘top-down’ cooperation, ‘colonization’ non-participatory, etc.) they themselves criticized in the recent past” (MILANI 2012, p. 213).

As previously mentioned, since its independence struggle, Haiti has received thousands of agents, actions and projects, under the banner of international cooperation. Over the past three years the presence of national and international organizations and NGOs has expanded. Both forms of cooperation are present - NSC and SSC. This has led us to focus on the differences between each one, in a concrete way, through the way they organize their activities in Haiti.

**The North-South cooperation in Haiti**

For an overview of NSC, we begin with data provided by the OECD, particularly in reports covering the actions of that body, of the member countries and their partners in the actions they denominate International Intervention in Fragile States. These reports assess the impact of actions taken in about 13 countries (of which, so far only Haiti lies outside Africa) which takes as reference the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (OECD, 2008a). The guiding principles stated in these documents are the appropriation, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability. These principles are often updated at high level conferences conducted by the OECD. According to the document updated in 2008,

> the long-term perspective for international intervention in fragile states is to support national reforms, in order to constitute effective, legitimate and resilient institutions capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustainable development (OECD, 2008b).

The Haiti Chapter of the 2011 Report states that official development assistance in Haiti jumped from US$ 600 million between the years 2006 to 2009 to 1.7 billion in the period 2010 to 2011 (excluding humanitarian aid in both periods), which reached about 37% of the volume of funds pledged in March 2010 (OECD, 2011). This amount of money represents about 60% of the state budget and more than 85% of the public investment programs. The same report states that transfers from the Haitian diaspora in 2010 exceeded $ 1.9 billion and represent more than 30% of Haiti’s GDP. The OECD estimates that about 40% of Haitian households depend, to varying degrees, on these transfers. Figure 1 summarizes the data for international donations to Haiti, in terms of ODA, from the OECD.
Figure 1 - Volume of resources destined for Haiti, by OECD members (2008-2010)

Haiti

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>Net CDA (USD million)</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>3,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral share (gross CDA)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net CDA / GNI</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Private flows (USD million)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>95</td>
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For reference

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<tr>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<tr>
<th>GNI per capita (Atlas USD)</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<tr>
<td>520</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>650</td>
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Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2009-10 average) (USD m)

1. United States  | 714  |
2. IDB Sp. Fund  | 613  |
3. IDA           | 302  |
4. Canada        | 289  |
5. IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | 230 |
6. EU Institutions | 193 |
7. Spain         | 152  |
8. France        | 131  |
9. Japan         | 40   |
10. Norway       | 36   |

Source: OECD (2012).

As can be seen in Figure 1, among the 10 largest donors (in gross terms) of resources to Haiti are six countries (bilateral cooperation), and the remaining four are units or agencies of international partner organizations of the OECD (multilateral cooperation), such as the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB-Sp. Fund), the IMF (Concessional Trust Funds), the European Commission and the World Bank (IDA). In this paper, we summarize the actions carried out by the United States, France and Norway, due to the particular characteristics they present.

Since 1915, with varying justifications, the U.S. has maintained a strong presence in Haiti. According to the U.S State Department, the U.S.A. has been the largest donor of funds to Haiti since 1973 (USA, 2012). In this paper, we are interested in the formal cooperation projects that have been undertaken there, particularly since the 2010 earthquake. Since then, the U.S. has defined four areas of cooperation: infrastructure and energy; food and economic security; governance, rule of law and security; and health and other basic services in three regions of the country: Port-au-Prince and surroundings, San Marcos, in centre-west, and Cap Haitien, in the northern region (USA, 2013). We focus our discussion exclusively on health-related projects.
Prior to 2010, the U.S. supported the provision of basic health services (such as maternal and child health and immunization, for example) to about 50% of the Haitian population. After the earthquake, new demands in the area of disability care and outbreaks of infectious disease were included in the care services supported by USAID (2013). The U.S. government is also active in the reconstruction of the health infrastructure destroyed by the disaster. In June 2012, an agreement was signed between the two countries, with which the Government of Haiti is expected to assume full management of its health system, including reducing its dependence on foreign donations.

The website of the French Diplomatic Corp, when listing the important dates of its political relationship with Haiti records the year 1838, when the two countries signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship; the signing of a Cultural Agreement in 1945; a new agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation in 1973; 1986, when the agreement of 1973 was renewed; 2007, with the formulation of the Statute of Partnership between the two countries, and 2010, with the visit of the then French president to Haiti, the first foreign head of state to visit the Country, shortly after the earthquake (FRANCE, 2011a).

The French presence in Haiti includes more than a century of colonial exploitation. After Independence, the French ignored Haiti for at least two centuries (GAUTHIER, 2010). For the writer and philosopher Regis Debray, in an interview with Le Figaro, in February 2010, Haiti would have lived 400 years in solitude and the disaster of 2010, albeit dramatically, allowing the world, and France in particular, “to wake up from a long sleep” to fulfil its historic and moral duty (DEBRAY, 2010). In the UN conference in 1945 it was Haiti that argued that French should be the second language and that organization and it remains a stronghold of the French language in the Caribbean. The writer also suggested that countries should adopt a role of “student of humanity” and collaborate with Haiti on an equal footing without the usual leadership from the front seen in international cooperation.

From the few hours of President Sarkozy’s stay in Haiti came the commitment to send 326,000 Euros in emergency aid to the country. Since then, several projects have been implemented in Haiti, mostly by NGOs. Specifically in the area of health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports the interventions of the French Red Cross in four health centres, two of which are located in Port au Prince, more precisely in Cité Soleil, and two in Petit-Goave. These projects aim to improve the infrastructure in the centres by donating equipment and materials (FRANCE, 2011b).

In addition to the projects funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Red Cross supported seven basic health units in the capital and in Petit-Goave. In its latest report on the situation and perspectives for its role in Haiti it says that besides the reconstruction and
renovation of health facilities, it modernized the management system and trained personnel, including for the treatment of cholera, which has become endemic in the country (CROIX-ROUGE FRANÇAISE, 2012). As for funding, the report states that of the total of 42.7 million Euros raised by December 2012, about 36 million were used during the first 36 months after the earthquake. In view of this and the possibility of expanding institutional funding, the organization will continue its mobilization regarding the population affected by the earthquake until the end of 2014, particularly in response to the cholera epidemic. Among its institutional and operational partners, the French Red Cross cites the European Union, UNICEF, Veolia Foundation, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Entrepreneurs du Monde and L'Architectes de l’Urgence. Among its private donors, it cites, among many others: Accor, Air France, L’Oréal Foundation, Google, HSBC, Johnson & Johnson, Microsoft, Nestle, Mitsubishi, etc.

Norway has also been present in aid of Haiti. Its government provided US$ 35 million in emergency aid immediately after the 2010 earthquake (NORWAY, 2010a). Of that amount, the first formal act of cooperation, it transferred about 1 million to support the Cuban doctors who were already working in Haiti (NORWAY, 2010b). The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the long experience of Cuba in Haiti and also the fact it offers free health training to Haitians. This support was renewed in two more than agreements, until July 2012, and totals approximately US$ 2.5 million (CUBA and NORWAY ..., 2012).

With plans to allocate up to US$ 135 million for humanitarian assistance to Haiti over four years, since 2010, Norway has proposed the promotion of political dialogue and collaboration to make the country less vulnerable to natural disasters. Agriculture, reforestation and alternative energy sources were the topics included in the Norwegian cooperation with Haiti, as well as the protection of women and children. The Secretary of State at the time, Ingrid Fiskaa considered it necessary to change the mode of cooperation in Haiti, given the meagre results of decades of assistance to that country. For her, the low economic potential and high concentration of power have contributed to maintaining the impoverishment of rural areas. She defended the leadership of the Haitian Government in development initiatives but highlighted the need to deliver more power and resources to local and regional authorities, as well as demanding greater transparency and control over resources (NORWAY, 2010a).

Norwegian assistance has been channelled through multinational organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations and triangular cooperation agreements, such as that it conducts with Cuba. As a member of the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, Norway directs much of its financial resources to a donors’ fund, led by the World Bank. For the allocation of
resources and participation in decision-making, Norway is considered one of the most important partners of Haiti, alongside the United States, Canada and Brazil (NORWAY, 2010c).

In late 2012, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) considered its commitments on economic cooperation to Haiti were fulfilled, having directed there approximately US$ 140 million, of which about US$ 35 million was in humanitarian aid. The assessment of the results was also highly positive in priority areas such as governance and dialogue, prevention of natural disasters, clean energy and health. According to the Agency, Norway has a clear, long-term focus, the strengthening of democracy and Haitian institutions, the strengthening the dialogue between political groups and the inclusion of women in decision making at the local and national levels (NORAD, 2012). Among the OECD countries, Norway is a major presence in actions in North-South-South cooperation, such as those it conducts with Cuba in its projects in Haiti.

South-South cooperation in Haiti

With regard to the SSC, ALBA-TCP and UNASUR are used as reference sources. Both have been established fairly recently and are in the process of consolidation, including in terms of their administrative practices, which is the reason the data systematization is not standardized. Here, we present the principles that guide the actions of these two bodies, as well as the projects and actions directed towards Haiti as part of multilateral cooperation.

The ALBA-TCP was constituted as a meeting place of the peoples and governments who see Latin America and the Caribbean as one great nation - the ‘Pátria Grande (Great Homeland)’ of Bolivar and Marti. Thus, it is understood that the countries of the region should be united to jointly address the challenges affecting them. It is guided by the principles of solidarity, complementarity and genuine cooperation between the countries of the region, the rational use of natural resources, including energy, for the well-being of the people; it pursues the intensive and comprehensive training of human capital required for the development and attention to the needs and popular aspirations (ALBA-TCP, 2009).

In reference to the projects it promotes, ALBA-TCP adopts the adjective ‘grannacional’ and conceptualizes it in the political sphere, on: 1.) historical and geopolitical grounds, based on the Bolivarian vision of uniting the Latin America and the Caribbean republics 2.) socio-economic grounds, based on the observation that the development strategy of the countries in the region directed at dealing with the social needs of the people cannot be limited to the local level, but must extend beyond national barriers to strengthen endogenous
capacities, and 3.) ideological grounds, due to the conceptual affinity concerning a critique of neoliberal globalization, the need for sustainable development with social justice, sovereignty and self-determination of peoples, expressed with the purpose of generating sovereign regional political structures. The *grannacional* projects can be operationalized through existing national companies or *grannacional* companies. The economic dynamics of these companies focuses on the production of goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs and breaks with the logic of reproducing capital accumulation, which is the function of transnational corporations. Thus, not all projects are operated by *grannacional* companies but every *grannacional* company is linked to a project of that nature.

Among the most important initiatives developed by ALBA-TCP is the creation of Petroamérica that, under the leadership of Venezuela, has three sub-regional energy-integration initiatives: Petrocaribe (with a membership of 14 countries in the region, Haiti among them), the Petrosur (including the Mercosur countries) and Petroandina (including the countries of the Andean Community) (PETROCARIBE, 2009). Petrocaribe which is currently the main focus, has developed several projects, such as a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) plant, which has been operating since February 2007 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Storage and Distribution Vegetable-based Fuel in Dominica, inaugurated in June 2009, and the Camilo Cienfuegos refinery, reactivated in Cuba, which has been in operation since December 2007, with an output capacity of 67 thousand barrels per day. Power generation projects are also being developed in Nicaragua, Haiti, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Prior to Petrocaribe the countries in the region had no control over the supply of crude oil and its derivatives and were at the mercy of speculation and transnational intermediaries. In addition to direct support for energy production, Petrocaribe also supports the ALBA Caribe Fund, which, so far this year, has contributed 179 million dollars to 85 social projects in 11 countries in the region (PETROCARIBE, 2013). Since 2006, Haiti has been party to agreements with Petrocaribe, to purchase fuel oil under special financial conditions. In 2007, the agreement was expanded to provide 14,000 barrels of oil to Haiti, of which the country has assumed the payment of 40% of the total, within 25 years, at an annual interest rate of 1% (PETROCARIBE, 2009).

Since 2007, the Bolivar - Pétion - Martí Convention (Venezuela - Haiti - Cuba) confirmed the participation of the Venezuelan International Brigade in what is defined as ‘integral development’: cooperation for the transformation of the structural problems of Haiti. That same year, the Tripartite Intergovernmental Cooperation Office Haiti - Cuba - Venezuela was installed in Port au Prince. Specific plans include cooperation in the areas of health and education, agriculture and fair trade as well as three *grannacional* projects related to energy
resources. Data collected by Muhr (2012) show that, between 2007 and early 2010 ALBA-TCP contributed about 154 million dollars, which was administered through Haiti - Cuba - Venezuela Cooperation. Since the earthquake in January 2010, these resources have grown significantly. In the days that followed the earthquake, ALBA-TCP countries, such as Ecuador and Nicaragua responded immediately by sending staff to help. With Russian participation, the Venezuelan navy and air force established a sea and air corridor to ensure the rapid delivery of aid to Haiti.

In late January 2010, the Political Council of ALBA-TCP defined, in emergency terms, the Plan para la contribución solidaria de los países de la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA-TCP) al esfuerzo de reconstrucción de Haití. The Plan included cooperation in healthcare, logistics, infrastructure, transportation, technical support and supply and created the Banco de ALBA, a Humanitarian Fund to provide resources for the projects. The Plan also stressed the key role of the Haitian government and people in the reconstruction of Haiti in order to guarantee its sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, it criticized the excessive retention of foreign military forces in Haiti, in the absence of clearly defined reasons, authority, purpose, competence and length of stay (ALBA-TCP, 2010). Thus, the ALBA-TCP reiterates that the Plan seen in its conceptions and principles, not as an isolated act of humanitarian aid, but as a component of its strategy to promote a counter-hegemonic collective effort for structural transformation.

Muhr (2012) states that the ALBA-TCP adopts a revolutionary approach, based on Bolivarian internationalism, peacekeeping and intervention that can be understood as a ‘broad view’ of humanitarianism that does not mean a militarized humanitarianism, nor an isolated humanitarianism based on short-term technical assistance. For him, the proposal from ALBA-TCP seeks to achieve emancipatory and structural transformations, for which it requires military alliances to fend off aggressive imperialist projects. For this same reason it is always ready to help the countries of the region, whether associate members or otherwise. So it was, for example, with the cases of Honduras during the coup against President Manuel Zelaya and Haiti, before and after the 2010 earthquake.

UNASUR was formally constituted in 2008, with the objective of building a South American identity and citizenship and developing an integrated regional space in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and infrastructure spheres, to contribute to the strengthening of unity in Latin America and the Caribbean. [...]
and based on the principles of absolute respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the States; self-determination of peoples, solidarity, cooperation, peace, democracy, citizen participation and pluralism, universal indivisible and interdependent human rights; reduction of asymmetries and in harmony with nature for sustainable development (UNASUR, 2008, p.1).

Like the ALBA-TCP, UNASUR also has numerous projects in Haiti, even though it is not a member country. In August 2010, the UNASUR-Haiti Technical Secretariat was established to oversee the implementation of decisions taken at the meeting of Heads of State of the members, in February of the same year in Quito, including:

Contribute so that the international cooperation that reaches Haiti responds to the demands, the needs and priorities of the country, within the framework of absolute respect for national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. Along the same lines, to support the strengthening of the institutions of the Haitian state, with the goal of promoting the efficiency of cooperation, social development and economic development, the furtherance of democracy and the preservation of peace and security. [...] Delivering a new south-south cooperation, by monitoring the medium and long-term restructuring process, respecting the sovereignty of Haiti, while strengthening the state institutions and developing local capacity. [...] (UNASUR, 2010).

At the request of the then President Rene Preval, the Heads of State of UNASUR immediately decided to include the following priorities:

- Infrastructure and energy - a) road construction: resources for the acquisition of material, machinery and the allocation of engineers to contribute to Haiti’s infrastructure, in particular through the construction of roads that will be determined by the Haitian government; b) Power: recover the grid and study the impact of gas as alternative energy source in the Haitian situation;
- Agriculture - to contribute to the reconstruction of the agriculture and production food sector through the donation of seeds, inputs, fertilizers, and by sending experts. Within this context the “Pro-huerta” and Food Security Programme models will be taken into account”;
- Health - increase the actions already implemented by the South American Council of Health (UNASUR, 2010).

To deal with these tasks, the UNASUR Fund was created to finance activities in all three lines of action, to begin with through the donation of 100 million dollars from member states, in addition to the request from the IDB for a line of long-term credit of up to 200 million dollars, at interest low rate, assumed by the countries of UNASUR. A report prepared in 2011 on the employment of resources and ongoing projects in Haiti reported the transfer of 70 million dollars for the implementation of 114 projects and a commitment to implement a further 77 (GIRALDI, 2011).

In health, since 2010, UNASUR has included the South American Institute of Government in Health (ISAGS), a public intergovernmental entity the main objective of which is to promote exchange, critical thinking, knowledge management and the generation of innovations in the field of policies and governance in health. In order to make
available to the best practices and evidence enhancing health management to the Health Ministries in South America. ISAGS is also dedicated to developing leaders in systems, services, organizations and programs in health, as well as technical support to government institutions in the same sector (ISAGS, 2011).

In March 2012, the UNASUR published the Informe de Actividad, a summary report of the activities of the UNASUR Technical Secretariat in Haiti, since its inception. The document reaffirms the non-invasive spirit of South-South cooperation, including respect for cultural identity, the history of the country and the region and the challenge of (re)building state sovereignty (UNASUR, 2012). The projects were considered to have met the priorities previously defined by UNASUR and the Government of Haiti, covering the areas of Health, Food Security and Housing and the Strengthening the Rule of Law, with a total of about 5.6 million US dollars committed until 2012 (UNASUR, 2012).

As Buss and Ferreira (2010, p. 107) note “the areas of agriculture, health, education and reinforcing institutions are among the main areas recently covered by South-South cooperation.” In the specific area of health in UNASUR, the authors consider SSC exemplary in helping to strengthen the notion of ‘health diplomacy’ expressed by the Ministries of Health and Foreign Affairs of the member countries.

Mapping the actions of individual countries, we can identify specific actions and projects from Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil, as previously recorded (GOULART, COSTA and MISOCZKY, 2013). In this paper, we summarize the actions and projects of Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil, with an emphasis on health.

The root of the approximation between Venezuela – Haiti is in what Chavez recognized as an historic debt (MURH, 2012). Haiti, under the government of Alexandre Pétion, supported the liberation struggle led by Bolivar, sheltering him during his exile and offered him financial support and weapons. However, Haiti was not included among the Latin American countries invited to attend the Conference of Panama in 1826, organized by Bolivar (GORENDER, 2004). Furthermore, the involvement of the United States (supported by France and Canada) in the coup against Aristide in 2004 is considered part the same pattern of attempts against Chavez himself in 2002 and Zelaya in 2009.

The position of leadership assumed by Venezuela in the cooperation efforts with Haiti, since Chavez came to power is undeniable. Either through direct cooperation or decisively increasing actions and projects through the ALBA-TCP or UNASUR, in bi-or trilateral efforts, Venezuela is, along with Cuba, is a major international player in Haiti. As shown above, Petrocaribe has several projects in the region and in Haiti. It has provided fuel and supported the installation of local power plants responsible for generating 20% of the power in the country in 2011. On a visit to Venezuela in December 2011, President Martelly said
Venezuela's aid had made the biggest impact on the reconstruction of Haiti (VENEZUELA, 2012; VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, 2012).

In fact, Venezuela seems to act as a great facilitator of cooperative agreements and partnerships, primarily with governments in the region. Besides the abovementioned Haiti - Cuba - Venezuela Agreement, it has established partnerships with the government and the Cuban Brigade for the construction of a hospital, with investments of US$ 78,000. Other projects in the areas of mass literacy, energy, forestry and tourism are being developed under the auspices of this agreement (ALBA TV, 2012). In August 2012, the Venezuela - Argentina – Haiti Agreement was signed to develop the program *Fortalecimiento de los Sectores Agropecuario y de la Salud en Haití* – (Strengthening the Farming and Health Sectors in Haiti) (Depablos, 2012). The four countries (Venezuela, Argentina, Cuba and Haiti) have also agreed to create a joint venture to manage the funds of the Petrocaribe projects in Haiti to build shelters, donate infrastructure for education and provide 300 scholarships to underprivileged youth (TELESUR, 2012).

Cuba's presence in Haiti, particularly in the area of health, predates the disaster of 2010 by many years. It is quite common to hear or read the phrase from Cubans and Haitians, “the Cubans were not the first to arrive in Haiti [in reference to the 2010 earthquake] because they were already here.” Hundreds of health professionals have been in Haiti since Hurricane Georges in 1998, which destroyed 80% of the cultivated areas, displaced 167,000 people and killed 230. That ended a 36-year period during which there was no diplomatic relations between the two countries. At the time, several projects were developed, the main one involving cooperation in health. Besides sending health professionals to Haiti, since that period many young Haitians have had the opportunity to train at the Latin American School of Medicine (ELAM) (KIRK and KIRK, 2010). The SEGIB [2010] document showed Cuba to be second in the number of projects in Haiti (22), eight of which there are in health area and one in water supply and sanitation.

Approximately 6000 Cuban professionals worked in Haiti between 1998 and 2010, while about 550 Haitians graduated from ELAM and a further 560 began training there between 1999 and 2010. According to Kirk and Kirk7 (2010), at the time of the earthquake there were 744 Cuban doctors in Haiti. Immediately after the earthquake the Cuban government sent 350 members of the Henry Reeve International Medical Brigade. Another 546 professionals educated at the ELAM and originating from various countries, and 184 Haitian students in the fifth and sixth years were in Haiti, working in 20 rehabilitation centres

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7 Emily J. Kirk and John M. Kirk worked in 2010 on a project about the Cuban health internationalism, sponsored by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
and 20 hospitals. About 50% of the Cuban doctors were directed to the interior of the country. The same authors also mention the project presented to the WHO to rebuild the public health system in Haiti, which is developed with the support of the ALBA-TCP and Brazil and includes the construction of hospitals, polyclinics and medical schools. In November 2011, Cuba confirmed to Haitian President the construction of seven hospitals and five health centres (DEFEND.HT, 2011).

While Venezuela acts as a regional facilitator, providing resources that enable actions, Cuba is responsible for operating various projects on Haitian soil. Besides its strong leadership in SSC, Cuba has had a major presence in tripartite cooperation, including working with resources from developed countries situated among the 10 major OECD donors. With Norway, the Cuban government carries out and has often renewed agreements to ensure the continued service of Cuban doctors in Haiti. In July 2012, as part of an agreement between the two countries, Norway contributed US$ 800,000 to the Cuban Brigade in Haiti (CUBADEBATE, 2012). Recently, the Cuban ambassador in Haiti, Ricardo Garcia noted about 19 million medical attendances by the Cuban Brigade since its arrival in Haiti, and reaffirmed its commitment to remain in that country, in order to contribute to strengthening of its public health system (MÉDICOS CUBANOS... 2013).

Brazil, besides coordinating the MINUSTAH, in March 2010, signed the Memorandum of Understanding Brazil-Cuba-Haiti in Port-au-Prince, with the presence of the Ministers of Health from Brazil and Cuba, and the then President Henry Preval. The Memorandum aims to combine efforts to recuperate infrastructure and train health professionals in order to strengthen the public health system in Haiti. Brazil’s role includes: supporting the recovery and construction of hospitals; contributing to the acquisition of equipment, ambulances and health supplies; providing scholarships to train Haitian health professionals; supporting the improvement of care management and surveillance in Haiti; and supporting measures to strengthen the primary care system in Haiti. Cuba’s responsibilities include: supporting and assessing logistics operations; providing health and support professionals; and training Haitian health professionals. Haiti is responsible for: identifying areas in which health facilities need to be installed; identifying which health units to be refurbished; supporting logistics planning and providing security for health facilities; identifying health professionals that will receive training; identifying high school children to be trained as health technicians; and paying the salaries of the Haitians who work on the premises covered by the Memorandum. This so-called tripartite cooperation is coordinated by a Steering Committee with representatives from the Ministries of Health of the three
countries. This Committee coordinates all the other components of the Memorandum in their respective countries.

There is no record of the presence of the involvement of Brazilian Ministry of Health in projects in Haiti before the 2010 earthquake. Immediately following the disaster, a Working Group was constituted to organize emergency operations, such as the arrival of volunteers, donations of medicines, equipment and supplies, etc. This emergency action altered with arrival in Haiti of the National Coordinator for Health in Mercosur. After this visit, which took place in February 2010, the terms that resulted in the drafting of the Memorandum began to be outlined. The main priorities within the scope of Brazilian responsibility are: support for the organization and qualification of health services management; support for organizing and upgrading epidemiological surveillance and the national immunization program; provide grants to Haitian health professionals acting in health units, by priority in their communities; support the training of community health workers; support the creation of a Health Services Technical School; support the implementation of the Haitian Institute for Rehabilitation (in conjunction with the Human Rights Secretariat of the Presidency, Brazilian Foreign Ministry Cooperation Agency and the Institute of Social Responsibility of the Albert Einstein Hospital); strengthen epidemiological monitoring and immunization program; support the construction and adaptation of four modular-type Emergency Care Units (ECUs); rebuild damaged health facilities; purchase equipment and furniture, purchase of 20 4x4 ambulances to serve the health facilities; build housing modules for health professionals alongside the community health facilities; purchase computer equipment, medicines, supplies and healthcare equipment.

The logic behind the joint action of Brazil, Cuba and Haiti can be summarised as being: to strengthen the Haitian state, specifically with regard to its ability to act in the health area; the delivery and installation of health care equipment; ensuring the delivery of inputs for the first two years of operation of the new equipment; training professionals at all levels and strengthening community ties. Besides their cultural ties, Brazil and Cuba share a common concept in relation to the principles that should guide a health system, as both consider health to be a universal social right.

In a review meeting held on March 2013, in Brasilia, attended by the Ministers of Health of Brazil and Haiti and the Deputy Minister of Health of Cuba, the Brazilian participation in Haiti was judged to be the most important to date in the area of health cooperation. They each emphasized the interactive and solidarity-based nature of this Tripartite Cooperation. Teams from the three countries work together and set priorities based on the statements made by representatives of the Haitian government. The crisis in the
developed countries and the resulting decline in the provision of funds was cited as another element that strengthened the importance of SSC. The innovative model of management, through the Steering Committee, was also indicated as one of the determining factors for achieving results. But as the head of the International Affairs Advisor of the Brazilian Ministry of Health cautioned, “the principle is to meet the demands and not offer what you want […]. The recipient always has the last word.”

Non-governmental actors involved in the international cooperation in Haiti: the NGOs

According to Kraychete (2012), as from the 1970s, NGOs were first incorporated by international intergovernmental organizations into international forums based on the propositions of good governance. However, it is only from the 1990s that these organizations gained greater visibility and have since practically become icons of effectiveness in carrying out functions that, in the neoliberal conception, the State was neither able to effectively perform nor should assume.

Because the multilateral organizations, such as the UN system and the new guidelines for the international cooperation agencies were also passing through transformations, the NGOs represented innovative and very timely organizational possibilities. In Haiti, prior to the 2010 earthquake, NGOs had become the main recipients of funds from agencies such as USAID or the Canadian Association for International Development, the European Union, and public or private entities, such as the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. Furthermore, through Economic Assistance and Social Funds, the NGOs began to receive funds from loans contracted by the Haitian government, especially through the Inter-American Development Bank (SCHULLER, 2007).

After the earthquake, the number of NGOs in Haiti grew enormously as did the imprecision in relation to the number of them there. Unda and Dasmar⁹ [2011?], for example, speak of 10,000 NGOs that receive and manage international aid. Lengyel and Bernabé

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⁸ Recorded by the authors of this paper, who attended the event.

⁹ Yarisma Unda is a sociologist, researcher and university professor; Michee Dasmar is a student of Sociology of Development and a Haitian poet. They are members of the Colectivo Bolívar y Pétion - Espacio of Reflexión y Acción sobre America Latina y Caribe.
(2009) refer to about 750 NGOs that channel something like 70% of all the international cooperation funds for development in Haiti.

The fact is that, despite the discrepancy regarding the exact numbers, the presence of NGOs in the international relief operation in Haiti is significant, especially so after the earthquake. In an attempt to systematize the information about these actors that are so present in international health cooperation in that country, we focused our search on the site of the MSPP and Haiti Aid Map\(^{10}\), as mentioned earlier in this paper. Of a total of 169 identified NGOs from 19 different countries\(^{11}\), 148 are registered in the MSPP and 29 undertake projects with the MSPP. We obtained information on the budgets of 62 of them, totalling about US$ 755 million. The countries with the largest number of NGOs are the USA (97), France (11) Germany (8).

Of particular note among the American NGOs registered in the consulted sources are the Bill Clinton Foundation, due to the volume of resources mobilized and its mode of operation in Haiti. Immediately after the earthquake, the Clinton Foundation established a fund of 16.4 million USD, originating from individual donations. Since 2010 it has spent about USD 28 million, including aid funds and projects in Haiti involving community restoration, sustainable development and training.

Its main donors are: The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, UNITAID; USAID; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Stephen L. Bing; COPRESIDA-Technical Secretariat; Fred Eychaner; Frank Giustra; The Radcliffe Foundation; Tom Golisano; The Hunter Foundation; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; The ELMA Foundation; Theodore W. Waitt, 2012) (CLINTON FOUNDATION, 2012).

Among its main beneficiaries are the NGOs: Partners In Health, with US$ 250,000; Save the Children, US$ 250,000; Médecins du Monde, with US$ 250,000 MSF, with US$ 250,000; Oxfam, with US$250,000 in miscellaneous services including health and sanitation (CLINTON FOUNDATION, 2011).

The Bill Clinton Foundation seems to have become a sort of fundraising and distribution centre: it raises funds from entities and individuals from around the world and redistributes them to NGOs and multilateral organizations working in Haiti. Admittedly this is an issue that needs to be thoroughly examined in order to permit consistent assessments.

\(^{10}\) MSPP (http://www.mspp.gouv.ht/site/index.php); and Haiti Aid Map (http://haiti.ngoaidmap.org/)

\(^{11}\) 14 NGOs were identified as being transnational.
However, some scholars have expressed concern about the proliferation of NGOs operating in Haiti and for reasons that deserve attention.

Ricardo Seiteñfus, the former OAS representative in Haiti, in an interview with the Swiss newspaper Le Temps, in December 2010, which is available on his personal website, showed that since the earthquake, Haiti has become an unavoidable crossroads. For transnational NGOs, Haiti has become an obligatory staging post. I’d say it’s even worse: it’s a place for vocational training. The age of the collaborators who arrived after the earthquake is very low; they landed in Haiti without any experience. And Haiti, I can say, it is not appropriate for amateurs. After January 12, due to the massive recruitment, professional quality was considerably reduced. There is a maleficent or perverse relationship between the strength of the NGOs and the weakness of the Haitian state. Some NGOs only exist because of the Haitian misfortune (SEITENFUS, 2010).

Lengyel and Barnabas (2009), linked to the project *La reconstrucción de Haití: fortaleciendo las capacidades de Argentina para una cooperación efectiva* of FLACSO - Argentina, speculated that the strong presence of NGOs and the resources they receive do not necessarily ensure good quality results from the international cooperation. They suggest that it is important to identify the consequences of the replacing the state in providing services, or how this mechanism hinders the development of skills and consistent relationships between the state and its citizens. They conclude that, while in some cases the collaboration of the NGO may be very positive in others it is not. Therefore, they point to the need to control the risks of this choosing this option which has been so generally made, particularly by multilateral organizations.

**Analytical Possibilities: imperialism and internationalism as principles of international cooperation**

The volume of resources mobilized by the international community in this great challenge that the Haitian people have faced is striking, especially so since the 2010 earthquake. With similar motivations, in terms of what is publicly claimed, different notions of international cooperation have been set in motion in Haiti and when confronted by the reality of the situation, blend together. But one cannot ignore the basic differences or in terms of principles between the approaches adopted in NSC and SSC.

As stated by Dar (2008, p. 93-94):

> Health remains a critical aspect of development work, yet little attention has been paid to how development organizations uncritically assimilate development-management ideas leading to an unreflexive and, at times, inappropriate health development sector. [...] health management is also a social construction that relies on modernist assumptions to remain a legitimate idea within the development sector.
We extend this argument to the field of international cooperation on health and assume that the development-management ideas seem to be stronger in the countries that operate under the NSC approach. When it comes to relations between countries, we can speak of a connection between those ideas and imperialism.

Rosa Luxemburg was one of the leading Marxist intellectuals to discuss the subject of imperialism in trying to understand the problem of the expanded reproduction of capital. For her, expanded reproduction occurred from the extraction of labour value in the factory, mine and agricultural business, thus forming the industrial proletariat in capitalist economies. But she also considered the value acquired through the incorporation of natural and pre-capitalist social to be decisive. In her historical period, that would have included the agricultural areas of the peasant and craft-based economy, the survivors of the feudal era, the eastern peasant commune, which still survived in Russia, and especially the extensive area of the colonial world. For her, imperialism was an intrinsic movement for capital accumulation (ROIO, 2009). In attempting to update the notion of imperialism in the XXI century, contemporary Marxist thinkers have elaborated on the work of Rosa Luxemburg and the second volume of Marx’s ‘Capital’. In this paper we turn to David Harvey (2010) and Samir Amin (2005).

Harvey (2010, p. 31) describes and defines what he calls a special variety of imperialism: capitalist imperialism. That is a contradictory fusion between the ‘the politics of the State and that of the empire’ (imperialism as a distinctively political project on the part of actors whose power is based on the dominance of a territory and a capacity to mobilize the human and natural resources of the territory for political, economic and military purposes) and ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ (imperialism as a political-economic process diffused in space and time in which the domain and use of capital take precedence).

The first – ‘the politic of the State and the empire’ - emphasizes the political, diplomatic and military strategies of a State or a group of States which constitute a political power bloc and struggle to impose their interests and “achieve their goals in wider world.” The second – ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ - explain the way in which the flow of economic power establishes a trajectory in a continuous space, towards territorial entities (such as states or regional blocs) or away from them. Such molecular processes occur through the everyday practices of production, exchange, trade, capital flows and information, cash transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, cultural influences etc. (HARVEY, 2010, p. 31-32).

Amin (2005) argues that imperialism is not linked to a stage of capitalism, not even to its ultimate state. It is, from its origin, inherent to the expansion of the system. And now it is no longer a unilateral imperialism but a collective imperialism, or a new imperialism of the
triad: the United States, European powers and Japan. For him, we have passed the first and second phases in the development of imperialism, and have come to the third wave of imperialist devastation of the world, strengthened by the fall of the Soviet system and the nationalist populist regimes in the Third World. The objectives of capital remain the same - control the expansion of markets, the plundering of the planet’s natural resources, and the super-exploitation of labour in the periphery. But they are operating under new and, in some respects, quite different conditions from those found in the earlier phases of imperialism. According to Amin (2005, p. 104) “the ideological discourse designed to make the views of the peoples of the central triad coincide has been renewed and now is based on the ‘duty to intervene’, which would legitimize the defence of ‘democracy’, the ‘rights peoples’ and ‘humanitarian’ spirit (AMIN, 2005, p. 104). This “humanitarian spirit” is part of what has become an inevitable requirement in the dominant rhetoric ‘the fight against poverty’, at the same time that capitalism seems more victorious.

The thoughts of both these authors seem very similar to the strategies that the OECD countries develop in the NSC in Haiti. The “the capitalism of disaster”, as described Klein (2007) and now explored by Misoczky (2010) to demarcate the distinctive aspects of the Brazil - Cuba - Haiti cooperation, illustrates one of the various forms of imperialist political, diplomatic or military strategy adopted by the developed countries in their operations in that country. As stated by Klein (2005),

It seems that increasingly larger portions of the globe are under active reconstruction: being reconstructed by parallel governments composed of consulting firms, construction companies, mega-NGOs, UN agencies and international financial institutions. Of the people living in these reconstruction sites - Iraq to Aceh, Afghanistan to Haiti - one hears a chorus of similar complaints: the work is very slow when it occurs; consultants live very well with expenses and high salaries, while locals have no access to work, training or decisions; the builders of democracy give lessons to governments about the importance of transparency and good governance, yet most contractors and NGOs refuse to open their records to those same governments, let alone authorize control over how aid resources are spent (KLEIN, 2005, p.2).

Rigged by imperialist interests, the various military interventions since the French occupation, including the various occasions when the U.S. has imposed itself there, but also by the international forces, such as the MINUSTAH, have not allowed the Haitian State to establish itself in the classic Weberian sense- one that has a monopoly of force. Force in Haiti, is still under the command of foreign staff. That is, the very concept of the state is called into question by the imperialist mechanisms. The constant reference to the institutional weakness of that country plus the repeated information that that is the poorest country in the West,

The first - the mercantilist phase - between 1500 and 1800, the second - the classic phase - which was from 1800 until the Second World War (AMIN, 2005).
camouflages the production of poverty engendered by imperialism since its first phase. Or as Hallward (2010), has said regarding poverty in Haiti “it is direct legacy of what is perhaps the most brutal system of colonial exploitation in world history [...]”.

By contrast, the cooperative actions under the umbrellas of TCP-ALBA and UNASUR seem more connected to internationalist principles. These principles, originally announced in the Communist Manifesto, written by Marx and Engels between December 1847 and January 1848, were founded on the need for solidarity among the workers of the world. For Lowy (1998), the challenge of overcoming capitalist exploitation is not restricted to the workers but to every victims, of categories and social groups oppressed of this system. Considering the statements of Marx and Engels in the Manifesto, Löwy (1998) suggests that internationalism was, simultaneously, a strategy of organization and struggle of the proletariat against capital and an expression of revolutionary humanist perspective. Thus, human emancipation would be the supreme ethical value and the ultimate goal of socialist struggle.

During World War I, nationalism proved to be stronger than the expected solidarity among workers, placing them in a fight for their nation-states. This fact led to the generalization of a supposed complete antagonism between nationalism and internationalism in Marxist thought. Lowy (2000) explains that this antagonism is a fallacy, because the opposition to Marxism is nationalist ideology, i.e., the elevation of nationalism as an extreme value for which class differences are suppressed and the subjects are unified in conflicts of interest that are made universal by the ruling class. For him, socialist internationalism does not reject national historical and cultural traditions. The internationalist movements of each country speak the national language and, of course, speak the language of history and national culture – “especially so, of course, when that culture is oppressed” (LÖWY, 2000, p. 89).

In this conception, internationalism includes, as an essential condition of international solidarity, the recognition of national rights. Only then is it possible to understand those cooperative actions which, in addition to meeting the demand of countries and peoples in a precarious situation, respect their sovereignty and self-determination.

The Cuban tradition in internationalist actions in health began in 1963, just four years after the Revolution, a period which certainly required all available strength to build a new history. The first Cuban medical mission was sent to Algeria that year and since then the country has committed to “take care of the poor of the planet in the name of international solidarity” (LAMRANI, 2013).

Löwy (1998) believes that “a new internationalist culture is forming” in the twenty-first century, “especially in Latin America,” with the emergence of a revolutionary left that is sensitive to international issues [...]. This is certainly the case of Venezuela, with Chavez’s
rise to power and the various initiatives taken for the reconstruction of Latin American solidarity. Some of the initiatives listed in this study are representative, such as the formation of Petrocaribe and other actions underway in Haiti specifically.

**Final remarks**

We can now consider the likely responses to the question posed in the title – organization, for what purpose? Evidently, here, we are taking organization as a verb, that is, the process of organizing. Based on the data we surveyed here and the categories we seek to achieve an initial analysis, the choices are the clear regarding the different ways of organizing international aid for health in Haiti.

As shown, the NSC organizes its activities in Haiti predominantly through NGOs. Writing immediately after the 2010 earthquake, Smith (2010) stated that:

> instead of aiding the Haitian state and building up its capacity to handle the crisis, the U.S. is funneling $379 million in aid through its own agencies and then through NGOs. According to the Associated Press: each American dollar roughly breaks down like this: 42 cents for disaster assistance, 33 cents for U.S. military aid, nine cents for food, nine cents to transport the food, five cents for paying Haitian survivors for recovery efforts, just less than one cent to the Haitian government, and about half a cent to the Dominican Republic.

For Harvey (2008), in the context of the rise of neo-liberalism, NGOs have functioned as ‘Trojan horses for neoliberal globalization’. In analogy, we can say that, in Haiti, they are the “rojan horses for imperialism.”

The big NGOs, which are getting the bulk of the money, see the crisis as an enormous opportunity to raise funds and their profile. Thus, instead of a centralized and logical relief effort, something only a sovereign state could provide, the NGOs are competing with one another, literally branding areas they serve with their logos (SMITH, 2010).

In an interview with Mike Whitney (2011), Smith clearly states his agreement with the imperialist character of the U.S. action in Haiti, operated via NGOs:

> [...] Today while the imperial powers plunder the third world, they funnel money into NGOs to make it seem like they are interested in aiding the very people they are robbing and exploiting. Haiti is perhaps the worst example of this process. While the U.S. imposed neoliberal plans that impoverished the people, it poured money into NGOs, cultivating the self-congratulatory illusion that it is helping Haiti. Just like the religious institutions of the past, the NGOs are part and parcel of imperial domination of third world countries. In Haiti, for example, 70 percent of the NGO funding comes from the U.S. state. As a result, they become vehicles for control through provision of the societies in which they operate. As Peter Hallward argues, ‘the bulk of USAID money that goes to Haiti and to other countries in the region is explicitly designed to pursue interests—the promotion of a secure investment climate, the nurturing of links with local business elites, the preservation of a docile and low-wage labor force, and so on’.
The answers we can outline from the actions organized under the SSC are certainly different. As we have seen, in this context the actions are organized predominantly by institutional means, i.e., they are organized through the dialogue between national representatives. Overwhelmingly, they are connected to projects developed together with the Haitian government and defined by its demands. Guided by internationalist principles, they seek to strengthen the Haitian State in its capacity to fulfil its role in relation to the population. It is true that these processes are often less visible and more time consuming. Decision-makers are permanently tempted to seek “flexibility” and the “results”. How to persevere in the face of urgency, how to resist the appeals of abundant financing?

We would wager on the resurgence/resumption of the utopia of Bolivar and Martí, on the construction of Patria Grande, one free and sovereign America. The sovereignty of each is connected to the sovereignty of all and in building relationships between equals, respecting their differences. As Martí (2011[1891], p. 29) said, “people should live criticizing themselves, because criticism is health, but with one chest and one mind. Down to the unfortunate and raise them in our arms! With the fire of the heart, to warm the frozen America”.

Learning to organize for solidarity is also an act of solidarity. So, also for this reason, the Brazilian participation in international aid for health that it is undertaking with Cuba seems so important to us. Brazil, the only Portuguese-speaking country in UNASUR, and with an unfortunate tradition of distancing itself from Latin American issues, seems to be treading a new path in international cooperation. While it still remains one of the central forces in MINUSTAH, it has also been playing an important role in cooperative solidarity, as illustrated by its participation with Cuba and Haiti in the Tripartite Memorandum.

Finally, we must also note that the differences that can be identified with some ease between the two strands of international cooperation become much more subtle in their concrete expressions. In fact, North-South-South Cooperation is a real example of this grey area, as is Brazil’s role in Haiti. To analyze the reasons behind the organized international aid efforts can contribute to clarify these contradictions and, in a praxeological effort, overcome them.

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